exercises in .NET Integrate barcode 3/9 in .NET exercises

exercises using none toencode none in web,windows application barcode The economic none none role of patents is much like that of copyrights. They increase the reward to inventive activity at the expense of inef cient use of the patented invention once it is created. However, patents are different from copyrights in several ways.

First, granting of copyrights for original work is automatic; the creator only needs to indicate that the work is copyrighted. Patents are obtained by ling an application with the U.S.

Patent and Trademark Of ce, which reviews the application for originality of the work. Second, enforcement of copyrights and patents is generally left to the holder of the copyright or patent. The primary exception to this is copyright infringement of songs and movies over the Internet, and the creation of devices or procedures that can be used to circumvent digital rights management (technologies designed to prevent copying).

These activities have been partially criminalized by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998. Third, the investment in research and development (R&D) needed to create many patentable commodities is very large relative to the investment needed to create most works of art. The pharmaceutical industry, for example, spends large sums on R&D and it seems likely that this would not occur without the ability to patent discoveries.

So the case for restrictive and strongly enforced patent law is more compelling than that for copyright law. As with many other aspects of property rights, the trade-offs here are complex, and they remain the subject of active consideration..

24.4 Exercises 1. Consider a none none n airport that is trying to sell exclusive rights to operate a wireless access network in its terminals. Depending on what proportion of all travelers use the network, it can become congested and result in a low-quality experience for everyone.

Speci cally, suppose for simplicity that there are N travelers at any given time during normal hours in the airport, and if a fraction x of them attempt to use the network concurrently, then the payoff to each of them will be 1 x. (We can view this payoff 2 as the amount they d be willing to pay for the service.) (a) When the airport sells the rights to operate the network to a third-party access provider, this provider will make back what it pays for the rights by charging travelers in the airport a fee to connect to the networks.

How much should the airport expect to be able to sell the rights for, how much will the third-party access provider in turn charge to travelers, and what will be the resulting sum of payoffs to all travelers Explain. (b) Suppose instead that the airport were to let people use the service for free. What would be the sum of payoffs to all travelers in this case Explain.

2. Consider the setup from Exercise 1, but now let s change the scenario a bit to suppose that there are two populations among the travelers through the airport, with members of one population valuing the wireless access service more than members of the other. In particular, suppose that travelers of type 1 receive a payoff of 1 x when a 2 fraction x of all travelers use the service.

(Here, the fraction x is based on the total usage by travelers of both types, because travelers of both types contribute to the shared congestion.) Travelers of type 2 receive twice this payoff, 1 2x, when a fraction x of all travelers use the service. Notice that both payoffs become 0 when x.

property rights reaches 1 , b none none ecause at that point the high congestion makes the service useless for 2 everyone. As in Exercise 1, the airport is going to sell the right to operate the network to an access provider, who will then charge a single price to all travelers (regardless of which type they are). (a) Suppose that the airport and the access provider know that half of all travelers are of type 1 and half are of type 2.

How much can the airport expect to sell the rights for, and how much will the access provider charge (b) Now let s consider a variation: suppose instead that only 5% of all travelers are of type 2, and the rest are of type 1. Again, both the airport and the access provider know this. Now how much can the airport expect to sell the rights for, and how much will the access provider charge .

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